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An existing accounting framework to describe an education system is elaborated and used as a 
framework for understanding and comparing the resource allocation policies of the South 
African and Argentinean schooling systems. The comparison highlights how, by paying fewer 
teachers more (relative to GDP per capita), South Africa is structurally forced to deal with 
relatively large class sizes. Both countries have attempted to use production function studies to 
understand ways of improving pupil performance, and in both countries the utilisation of 
education human resources appears particularly important. The economic case for expanding 
secondary schooling is perhaps not as strong as the policies, especially those in Argentina, 
suggest. Whilst rates of return to secondary schooling do not appear to offer concrete policy 
direction, a cross-country analysis that takes into account a secondary school completion ratio 
(a statistic calculated for this analysis) suggests that more policy emphasis should go towards 
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1  Introduction 
This paper aims to present an economically-oriented and policy-focussed comparison of the schooling 
systems of two middle income developing countries: South Africa and Argentina. For comparisons to be 
interesting and meaningful, there needs to be both sufficient similarities, and sufficient differences between 
the objects of comparison. South Africa and Argentina seem to satisfy these criteria. Both are middle income 
countries with elected governments espousing policies aimed at reducing poverty and inequality, partly 
through educational transformation. Both face high incidences of poverty (officially around 40% and 25% of 
the population in South Africa and Argentina respectively) and have recent experiences of authoritarian 
government aimed at promoting the interests of a small elite. The two countries are similar in terms of the 
size of the economy and the population, and both make the provision of schooling a provincial responsibility. 
At the same time, there are key differences with respect to educational policy, above all policies governing 
the determination of teacher salary and the allocation of teacher time.  
The comparison leads to two types of outputs. Firstly, policy conclusions relating to the more economic 
aspects of the two schooling systems are presented. Given how much analysis occurs in the two countries, 
these conclusions are to a fairly large degree re-iterations of what others have already said, though we have 
tried to present the conclusions in a fresh way, partly through new data analysis. Secondly, through some 
discussion of the economics of education epistemology in our countries, and in the developing world in 
general, we arrive at suggestions on how the contribution of economics of education to education planning 
can be enhanced.  
In section 2, an existing accounting framework to describe the key variables of an education system 
(originally put forward by Mingat and Tan in 1998) is extended, so that teaching time and class size are 
accounted for, and the framework is then used (in sections 3  and  4) as a basis for describing the two 
schooling systems. This analysis highlights how the two countries, despite similarities with respect to key 
economic variables, go about the schooling of their children in very different ways. South Africa pays its 
teachers relatively well, but requires them to teach large classes for a relatively long working year. Argentina 
pays its teachers less (relative to GDP per capita), but has smaller classes and a shorter school year. If one 
considers the hourly cost of teachers, then Argentina’s teachers are more costly than South Africa’s. An adult 
is three times as likely to be a teacher in Argentina as in South Africa. Perhaps the most prominent policy 
implication of the analysis is the importance in South Africa of training teachers to teach large classes, given 
the relatively inescapable nature of this phenomenon, at least in the medium term. 
Section 5 discusses briefly how economics of education (and research in general) does, or could, contribute 
towards better policy formulation processes. A recent Argentinean Ministry of Education assessment of the 
effectiveness of the research-policymaking link in the country is discussed, as is that MoE’s ongoing efforts 
at maintaining a publicly available education research database. Important hurdles in both countries have 
been the difficulty of accessing official statistical datasets, and the absence of an official MoE education 
research agenda. 
Section  6  provides a review of education production function studies from the two countries. Key 
methodological challenges are discussed, including the need to incorporate data on the human capital of 
teachers in the production function (as has been done in some other countries), the importance of exploring 
class size threshold effects, and ways of gauging the impact of decentralisation of powers to schools (a 
growing phenomenon in both countries) on pupil performance. Clearly, better use could be made of the vital  
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ONE (in Argentina) and Systemic Evaluation (in South Africa) datasets. Moreover, a challenge for the 
analysts is to devise ways of packaging production function findings in such a way that they become more 
digestible in the policy formulation process, and become more useful in identifying policy priorities and 
trade-offs. 
In section 7 ways of using economics of education to inform the expansion of the secondary schooling sub-
sector are explored. This is partly in view of the recent decision in Argentina to make schooling up to Grade 
12 compulsory for all pupils, and the fact that arguments to this effect have been made in South Africa. 
Studies on rates of return to education from both countries are discussed, and it is argued that these statistics 
would be strongly influenced by the absence of standardised qualifications below the Grade 12 level. This 
absence, which is unusual for an education system, gives rise to inefficiencies in both the labour market and 
within the education system. Five variables relating to secondary schooling, including a secondary school 
completion rate that is calculated, are used to gauge the situation in South Africa and Argentina in a global 
context. It is found that the completion rates for the two countries seem not to be problematically low (though 
the proportion of South Africa youths who successfully graduate from Grade 12 is probably too low). 
However, in both countries pupil performance at the secondary level is below what it should be (this is 
especially so in South Africa), and repetition is not declining as fast as it should.  
The conclusion in section 8 argues why it is important to remain very focussed on the quality of schooling at 
all levels, given its clearly demonstrated importance for economic growth and the development of society. In 
practical terms, both South Africa and Argentina should expand and make more public their sample-based 
quality monitoring programmes, and should fill the qualifications gap below the Grade 12 level. 
The question of what to include within the schooling system, typically the bulk of any education system, is 
subject to definitional flux. For the purposes of this paper, the optimal definition seemed to be the primary 
level (ISCED level 1) plus the general secondary level (ISCED levels 2A and 3A). Moreover, most of the 
focus is on public institutions within the system. In the case of South Africa, this means that the 
approximately 25,200 schools in the ‘public ordinary schooling’ system receive most of our attention. This 
system covers twelve grades – Grades 1 to 7 are referred to as primary schooling, and Grades 8 to 12 are 
referred to as secondary schooling. In the case of Argentina, our main focus falls on the approximately 16,800 
public schools offering primary and secondary schooling, which since the 2006 National Education Law, may 
follow either a 7 plus 5 grade combination (as in South Africa) or a 6 plus 6 grade combination. Provinces 
have the right to select one of the two options, either of which results in twelve grades of schooling.  
2  An accounting framework for schooling systems 
Equation 1 below is more or less Mingat and Tan’s (1998: 22) accounting framework. The equation 
represents an identity in the sense that most terms cancel each other out. It is an educational development 
model insofar as key ratios are expected to change in line with the level of development of the country. We 
use it due to its ability to highlight the relationships between key variables that describe an education system. 
Our discussion of the model in this section pays special attention to how the relevant statistics may be 















⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =   (1) 
For our purposes, the term 
GDP
Ge  refers to public spending on the schooling system (and not other aspects of 
the education system), over the country’s GDP. We can call this ratio relative (public) investment in 
schooling. The values are easily obtained from official statistics (GDP tends to be more easily obtainable 
than GNP, which Mingat and Tan use, and this explains our divergence from their paper here). To some 
degree, we will also examine the schooling system in its entirety, which includes private spending and private 
institutions, and in doing this it is useful to replace Ge with all spending, whether public or private, in public 
and private schools (remembering that public spending on private schools and private spending on public 
schools may exist). Information on private spending on schools has to be obtained from household data, and 
this can be problematic, especially if the household survey does not separate out expenditure on schooling 
from expenditure on pre-schooling and tertiary education.   
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,  which is the population enrolled in schools (of whatever 
age) over the population considered to be of school-going age. Here the public plus private ratio is more 
meaningful for planning purposes, though the ratio for just public schools allows us to compare the 
importance of the public system across countries. Typically, the gross enrolment ratio is calculated by using 
official Ministry of Education (MoE) enrolment statistics for the numerator and official population statistics 
from the country’s statistical agency for the denominator. This approach, however, may result in considerable 
errors, because the two values are collected from different institutions which may go about their data 
adjustment and finalisation processes completely independently of each other. The extent of the problem may 
be gauged by comparing MoE enrolment figures with the corresponding number of household members 
enrolled in schools. It may be preferable to calculate the gross enrolment ratio from one source, an annual 
sample-based household survey (or the census, in a census year). This is likely to yield a more reliable ratio, 
though questions about what the numerator and denominator values should be would remain. McMeekin 
(1998) and UNESCO (2004) provide a discussion of these and other education statistics problems.  





, or the population of school-going age over the total population, as the 
demographic demand for schooling. As Mingat and Tan (1998: 24) point out, the lower this demand, the 
greater the ability of the country to invest in the education of each child. Both the numerator and denominator 
values are obtainable from the statistical agency.  
We can refer to 
t P GDP
TS
 as relative teacher pay. TS is the average teacher salary in the sense of the 
average cost of each teacher (benefits should be included). The denominator represents the average income 
per capita, and so the whole term tells us the degree to which the income of teachers is higher than per capita 
income. Mingat and Tan (1998: 10) make the point that the value of this ratio can be expected to fall as the 
country develops, and as well paying jobs other than teaching become more common in the labour market. 
Cost per teacher can either be obtained from an analysis of payroll records, by examining the official teacher 
salary scales, or by dividing the total annual salary bill for teachers by the total number of teachers. 
Preferably, all three methods should be used to ascertain the accuracy of the TS value.  
The term A in equation 1 is inserted by us, and is referred to as the inflator for non-teacher costs. This 
inflator takes into account that to the cost of each teacher, we should add the cost of the items that allow a 
teacher to be productive, where these items include, for instance, non-teacher support personnel such as 
cleaning staff, textbooks, other teaching materials, and the basic running costs of the school building. We 
shall be limiting our use of equation 1 to costs incurred within schools themselves, so A does not take into 
account the cost of the administration of the system occurring outside the schools. Moreover, we consider 
managers based in schools as teachers, so their cost is incorporated in TS, and not in A. A value of A of 1.10 
would indicate that non-teacher costs come to 10% of the cost of teachers. Generally, the value of A is 
obtainable from an examination of the relevant financial statements of the education authorities. 
Finally,  T P e  refers to the pupil/teacher ratio, where T is the total number of teachers. The value of T may 
be obtained from payroll systems, or from annual school census data.  
It is likely that every value in Equation 1 will be obtainable, so the equation can serve as a means of verifying 
that the values one has obtained are correct.  
Equation 2 below decomposes the pupil/teacher ratio in terms of the relationship between contact hours 
received by pupils, contact hours put in by teachers, and average class size. The equation provides a 








T e ⋅ ⋅ =   (2)  
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Ideally, the pupil/teacher ratio should be pupils over teachers who spend at least some time teaching classes. 
Teachers who manage full-time (but are schools-based) or who provide support services such as counselling 
to individual pupils on a full-time basis should not be counted. Hence our denominator in the pupil/teacher 
ratio should ideally not be T, but Tc, where c is the proportion of teachers who actually teach. We call these 
teachers ‘classroom teachers’. The value of c may be obtainable from annual school census data.  
HT is the average annual hours of contact time put in by each classroom teacher. This may be obtainable from 
annual school census data, or from a special census of teachers, if one exists. However, given difficulties 
around obtaining this value, the best option may be to solve for HT using equation 2, assuming that all the 
other values are obtainable. HP is the average contact time offered to each pupil in a year. Importantly, it is 
not the contact time actually received by each pupil, which would be less than HP and would take into 
account the fact that the pupil is absent on some days due to illness or other reasons. The objective here is to 
establish how much contact time the schooling system offers to pupils. Calculating HP could involve taking 
the official contact hours that pupils should receive in a year, and subtracting an estimated number of hours 
lost in a typical year due not to pupil factors but to systemic or environmental factors such as strikes, bad 
weather, and the cancellation of classes due to festivities, sporting events, and so on. Data in this regard are 
commonly collected from schools in some form or another.  Where HP has a different value for different sub-
sections of the schooling system (for instance different grades), hours should ideally be weighted by number 
of classes for equation 2 to balance, but weighting hours by the number of pupils is sufficiently accurate. The 
ratio HT over HP can be thought of as an indicator of the intensity of teacher utilisation. If teachers put in as 
many hours as pupils are expected to receive, then the value of this indicator would be 1.0. However, the 
value is invariably less than 1.0 as teachers may be given free hours during the school day, and teachers take 
leave. CS is the average class size in the system. This is generally obtainable from annual school census data. 
Calculating HP involves multiplying the average daily hours of contact time offered to pupils, HPd
D H H Pd P ⋅ =
, by the 
average actual teaching days per year, D, giving us the following: 
  (3) 
Lastly, we can calculate the hourly cost, or hourly wage, WT, of classroom teachers by dividing teacher salary 
TS by the average contact hours put in by classroom teachers in a year, HT
T T W H TS ⋅ =
 . TS is thus decomposed as 
follows: 
  (4) 
3  The values for the two schooling systems 
In Table 1 the variables and ratios of the accounting framework described in the previous section are listed, 
and the 2006 values for the two schooling systems are filled in (as background, in row 2 we have included the 
figures for public spending on the entire education system, given how much attention these figures enjoy). In 
the case of each country, the ‘All’ column refers to private and public schooling combined, and the ‘Public 
only’ column refers to public schools only. With respect to funding, ‘All’ includes public funding of private 
schools, private funding of public schools, and private funding of private schools. These three categories of 
funding are all excluded from the ‘Public only’ column, which refers only to the public funding of public 
schools. Most of our focus was on obtaining values for the public system, as this is the sector we are 
primarily concerned with in our comparison.  
Table 1: Values for the two schooling systems in 2006  
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Variable  South Africa  Argentina 
    All  Public only  All  Public only 
GDP*  GDP  505,356   578,023  
Annual current expenditure on education*      25,761    29,479 
Relative investment in education      5.1%    5.1% 
Annual current expenditure on schooling*  G 18,825  e  16,084  25,635  21,512 
Relative investment in schooling    3.7%  3.2%  4.4%  3.7% 
Population enrolled in schooling  P 11,808,377  e  11,495,812  8,095,978  6,095,401 
Population of school-going age  P 10,816,511  sa    8,195,145  
Gross enrolment ratio    1.09  1.06  0.99  0.74 
Total population  P 47,390,900  t    38,970,611  
GDP per capita    10,664   14,832  
Demographic demand for schooling    0.23   0.21  
All teachers  T    350,452    475,857 
Pupil teacher ratio      32.8    12.8 
Average annual teacher salary*  TS    41,770    40,686 
Relative teacher pay      3.92    2.74 
Inflator for non-teacher costs      1.10    1.11 
Proportion of classroom teachers  c    0.96    0.78 
Average class size  CS    47.3    26.0 
Daily hours of contact time offered to the average 
pupil  HPd    5.2    4.4 
Average actual teaching days per year  D    194    165 
Annual hours of contact time offered to the 
average pupil  HP    1,003    727 
Annual hours of contact time put in by the average 
teacher  HT    725    458 
Intensity of teacher utilisation      0.72    0.63 
Hourly wage of classroom teachers*  WT    58    89 
Sources: A variety of education and finance ministry reports, and household data (for private spending).   
Note: Values marked with * are in 2004 USD PPP (GDP and annual current expenditure are in million USD PPP).  
 
Certain details regarding the derivation of the values deserve mention. Obtaining private household spending 
on schooling was facilitated in the case of South Africa by a household survey commissioned by the MoE to 
gather education-related information from households not collected in the regular household surveys of 
Statistics South Africa. This allowed for household spending on schooling to be separated from household 
spending on pre-school and tertiary education. Such data was not found for Argentina, and here a more 
indirect method using various sources was used. Both countries displayed substantial disparities between the 
enrolment figures of the MoE and the enrolment figures of the national statistical agency. However, whilst in 
South Africa the Statistics South Africa figures exceeded the MoE figures, in the case of Argentina, the MoE 
figures exceeded those of the INDEC (the Argentinean statistical agency). In the case of each country the 
values used for the gross enrolment ratio were decided on after consideration of the country’s statistical 
peculiarities by the two authors. Obtaining the number of teachers in the case of South Africa was a relatively 
simple matter involving an examination of annual school census data and payroll data. In South Africa, it can 
safely be assumed that virtually all teachers counted in the school census teach in one school only. However, 
in the case of Argentina, this assumption does not hold. Here use had to be made of data from a special MoE 
teacher survey, which collects the unique national identity numbers of teachers surveyed in each school, so 
that the double counting of teachers can be avoided. A nationally standardised payroll system in South Africa 
allowed for a relatively easy calculation of the average teacher salary, which was then verified in terms of 
overall expenditure and headcount data. However, in the case of Argentina, where the payroll systems are 
completely provincial, the approach taken was simply to divide the teacher salary item in the budgets by the 
number of teachers. In the case of both countries the contact hours worked by each teacher were derived 
using Equation 2 above given the absence of reliable data in this regard in South Africa, and problems around 
using the existing data in the case of Argentina.  
4  The policy architecture of the two schooling systems 
In this section we describe what one could refer to as the overall economic policy architecture of the two 
schooling systems. This description serves as an important backdrop to the issues-focussed policy discussions 
in sections 6 and 7 below. It is structured along the lines of the accounting framework referred to in the last  
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two sections. In a sense, we ask what features within each country’s policy make-up might explain the key 
values we see in Table 1. 
South Africa 
Public spending on schooling.  The level of public spending on schooling in the case of South Africa 
depends on both national and provincial factors. The national government is responsible for most tax 
collection in the country, and it is moreover obliged to fund provinces with respect to services that they must 
deliver. The effect of this arrangement is highly redistributive, with poorer provinces experiencing a level of 
funding by the national government that far exceeds the tax base. Though provincial governments have some 
scope for their own tax collection, the revenue based on this mechanism is on average just 3% of total 
provincial revenue. The remaining revenue of provinces comes from the national level. The bulk, around 
84%, of this revenue takes the form of a block grant whose size depends on the size of the overall fiscus as 
well as political decisions. The remaining 16% of the revenue received from the national level comes in the 
form of conditional grants tied to specific national priority programmes. However, only 1% of revenue 
received from the national level is in the form of conditional grants dealing with education priorities, making 
the education sector, relative to some other sectors, strongly subject to the provinces’ own budgeting 
decisions. The education conditional grants are focussed mainly on the school nutrition programme. The 
distribution of the block grant across provinces is driven by a formula that weights each province according 
to variables describing the demand for the services that provinces must deliver. Importantly, there is no 
costing of services in absolute terms in the distribution process, though introducing such absolute costing has 
been the subject of intense debate. All pre-tertiary education is a provincial responsibility, and here 
enrolments in both public and private schools and the size of the school-age population are the variables used 
in the distribution formula – both variables are equally weighted. Although the national formula lacks any 
absolute costing of services, it is possible to use the formula to arrive at theoretical budgets per province and 
per sector and these provide useful benchmarks against which to measure actual provincial spending on 
education. However, provinces are in no way obliged to divide the provincial budget up according to the 
weights in the formula, and differing understandings on how much funding ought to flow to education, and 
within education, to each of the education programmes, is a constant source of political tension between the 
national and provincial education authorities. With respect to education, however, provinces have funded the 
sector more or less at the level implied by the formula, deviating from it in general by no more than 10% 
either way. Public schooling accounts for around 85% of total provincial spending on education. The 
percentage of the total flowing towards public subsidies for private schools is extremely low, at about 0.5%, 
and almost half of this funding occurs in one province. Uniformity across provinces with respect to average 
per pupil spending on schooling is promoted, though by no means guaranteed, both through political 
persuasion (currently the same political party governs the national government and all the nine provincial 
governments) and through national spending policies, for instance with respect to non-personnel recurrent 
funding per pupil and the crucial national salary scales for teachers, which we shall discuss shortly.  
Private spending on schooling.  The country’s national teacher allocation policy and the non-personnel 
school funding policy, are to a large extent aimed at equalising spending across all pupils within one 
province’s public schooling system. However, their design also contributes towards keeping the private 
funding of school education relatively low through two important mechanisms. Firstly, the non-personnel 
funding policy has allowed affluent communities to supplement public funding of public schools through the 
charging of school fees, without any maximum limitations. Currently, in the 10% most advantaged segment 
of the schooling system – this corresponds more or less to the schools that served white communities under 
apartheid – private revenue amounts to around 50% of public revenue. In order to reconcile this arrangement 
with the government’s poverty alleviation commitments, poor households have the right to be exempted from 
the payment of school fees if they pass a means test designed nationally but administered by the school. The 
school carries the cost of these exemptions, a fact that tends to result in both dissatisfaction amongst fee-
paying parents and pressure on poor parents not to exercise their exemption rights. In spite of appearances, 
the policy of allowing considerable private funding in public schools serving affluent communities has 
arguably had the effect of suppressing private spending on schooling. Without this policy, it is likely that rich 
households would have left public schools spending below a level to which they were accustomed historically 
(apartheid public spending was not equal), and would have moved to private schools where the bulk of costs 
would have had to be covered through private revenues. The South African schooling system would have 
been less public, and more like a typical Latin American schooling system. In a sense, the government 
subsidises more affluent communities to stay in the public schooling system in the interests of social  
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cohesion. It is noteworthy that currently black pupils, largely from middle class households, make up about 
half of enrolments in formerly white schools, and that the proportion of pupils in private schools remains low 
at 3%. The second way in which private spending on schooling has been regulated has taken effect after 
2006, and involves the banning of school fees in the poorest 40% of schools. In 2006, these schools were 
charging relatively low fees amounting to around 2% of public funding. The policy that bans school fees for 
the poor is linked to national semi-binding public spending targets aimed at ensuring that non-personnel 
public funding per pupil by provinces is sufficient to cover the basics, including textbooks, stationery and 
building maintenance.  
Enrolment levels.  Enrolment levels are partly driven by a national policy that has made nine years of 
schooling compulsory since 1996. Thus a pupil who does not repeat any grades should continue to the end of 
Grade 9. Currently, around 5% of youths do not complete nine years of schooling, so the aims of the policy 
are to a large degree fulfilled (South Africa: DoE, 2008). However, grade repetition levels are relatively high, 
and just under 20% of youths do not enter Grade 9. High repetition levels lie behind the greater than 1.00 
gross enrolment ratio seen in Table 1. In fact, only around one-third of youths successfully complete Grade 
12, in the sense that they obtain the Grade 12 qualification, though about 50% of each cohort gets to 
participate in Grade 12. With regard to the pre-school level, current policy aims to universalise the one year 
preceding Grade 1 by 2010.   
Teacher pay. In South Africa, despite the fact that provinces employ teachers, a single set of national salary 
scales maintained through national bargaining with unions is applied. Crucially, teacher unions succeeded 
immediately after 1994 in setting the salaries for all teachers at the advantageous level enjoyed by white 
teachers under apartheid (white teachers comprised around 13% of all teachers). This largely explains South 
Africa’s relatively high teacher cost with respect to teacher pay over GDP per capita. It is noteworthy, 
however, that whilst the value for this indicator exceeds that for Argentina by far (3.92 against 2.74), teacher 
cost per contact hour is considerably higher in Argentina than in South Africa (this is examined in more depth 
below).   
Quantity of teachers.  In the late 1990s, the national government attempted to promulgate overall 
pupil/teacher ratio norms for the provincial schooling systems. It became clear, however, that provinces could 
not reconcile simultaneous constraints with respect to budgets, teacher salaries and pupil/teacher ratios. One 
of the three factors had to be left as a function of the other two. It was accepted that the pupil/teacher ratio 
would have to be left unconstrained. This had the unintended effect that the ratio, and the related question of 
class sizes, was left as a relatively un-monitored aspect of the schooling system. Only recently has policy 
attention been re-focussed on the matter, and in particular on class sizes, which in many schools are clearly 
excessive. It is estimated that around 10% of pupils are in classes with more than 65 pupils. The difference 
between class size and the pupil/teacher ratio is of course linked to the difference between the contact time of 
teachers and that of pupils. 
Contact time. The hours of teaching to be received by each pupil is specified in policy, and works out to an 
average of 1,003 hours per pupil per year, as indicated in Table 1. The hours that each teacher should teach, 
on the other hand, is somewhat ambiguous in the policies, and is subject to differing interpretations by school 
principals and teachers themselves. It is to some extent this policy uncertainty that lies behind the great 
inequality in class sizes. Teachers are to a large degree equitably distributed across schools relative to 
enrolled pupils. However, poor practices with respect to the utilisation of teacher time in many schools result 
in class sizes being much more unequal than they could be.  
Argentina 
Public spending on schooling. In Argentina, as in South Africa, the overall amount of public spending on 
schooling is the result of a mix of national and provincial factors. In Argentina, however, provinces play a 
larger role, partly because provincial own tax revenue is higher, at an average of around 25% of total revenue, 
though this varies greatly from one province to another. Most funding for provincial public services comes in 
the form of a non-earmarked grant for each province from the national government. In general, this national 
funding is divided across provinces in a highly redistributive manner, so in general poorer provinces receive a 
larger amount per capita than do the richer provinces. However, this pattern does not always hold true as the 
distribution formula is not systematically based on service demand data, as is the case in South Africa. 
Instead, the formula is based on a mix of political decisions taken many years ago, and some fairly dated  
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analysis of historical data. The formula does not provide a basis for estimating theoretical education budgets 
in provinces, as is the case in South Africa. Nonetheless, as in South Africa, the topic of the ‘right’ level of 
funding for education in each province is a contentious matter that provokes intense national-provincial 
debates (see for instance Morduchowicz, 2002). Though most funding from the national level is not 
earmarked, a limited amount is. Mostly, this pertains to a national programme, FONID, aimed at topping up 
teacher salaries in those provinces which pay below cut-offs set by the national government. This programme 
was started in 1999 in response to major union pressure relating to inter-provincial pay differences. Smaller 
earmarked amounts are used to supplement regular provincial funding of a variety of items such as textbooks 
and IT in schools. The FONID programme accounts for about 6% of total provincial spending on education, 
and the other earmarked amounts account for a further 2%.  
Apart from the fact that Argentinean provinces enjoy more own provincial tax revenue than South African 
provinces, there are a number of other factors that cause public spending per pupil in public schools to 
diverge more across provinces in Argentina than in South Africa. Just the fact that there are more sub-
national units in Argentina (23 provinces plus the capital territory) makes it more difficult for the national 
government to standardise provincially offered public services. Considerable party political diversity across 
provinces also complicates national alignment efforts. Enrolment rates are relatively uniform across 
provinces. What varies much more is the public funding going to each pupil in the public system. This is 
largely attributable to the fact that the teacher salary is determined at a provincial level. To some degree the 
FONID programme does reduce teacher salary differentials, but the overall picture is still one of large inter-
provincial differences. As in South Africa, the pupil/teacher ratio is subject to provincial decision-making. In 
one respect this is even more so in Argentina than South Africa. In South Africa, a national school staff 
establishment policy defines the kinds of teaching posts schools require, and lays down parameters for an 
equitable distribution of posts across schools within a province. However, as we have seen, it stops short at 
establishing inter-provincial equity in the staffing of schools. In Argentina, whilst a core nomenclature of 
teaching post types exists at a national level, the actual staff establishment policy is promulgated by each 
province.  
Unlike South Africa, Argentina has placed substantial emphasis on setting a norm for the overall amount of 
public spending on the education sector, as a proportion of GDP. These efforts culminated in the 2005 
Education Funding Act, which lays down in some detail how the national and provincial governments should 
increase the funding of education so that an overall level of 6% of GDP is attained by 2010. Historically, this 
figure has fluctuated around 4%. The bulk of the additional funding is expected to be derived from revenue 
collected nationally. The impetus behind the new law is partly the fact that Argentina’s public expenditure on 
education over GDP figure has tended to be below the Latin American average.   
Around 15% of provincial funding of schools flows towards private schools, which accommodate about 25% 
of all school pupils. This funding is primarily directed at financing the teaching staff of private schools. 
Approximately half of these schools receive sufficient public funding to cover the salaries of all their teaching 
staff, meaning that at least 80% of their running costs are covered by the state. It is telling to contrast these 
private schools with the South African public schools serving the high income decile of that country. The 
South African schools see only about two-thirds of their running costs covered by the state. Clearly, the 
classification of a school as a private school often has little to do with the amount of public funding received. 
In this instance, South Africa’s unique history and current political interest in seeing all schools, no matter 
how divergent, as part of an all-inclusive public system appear to be the overriding factors. However, it is 
also a question of conditions attached to public funds. All public funding to all public schools in South Africa 
is subject to the same public accountability rules, whilst in Argentina public funds directed to public schools 
are subject to different, and generally more detailed, accountability rules than public funds directed to private 
schools. 
Private spending on schooling. The high proportion of private schools in Argentina, in particular the high 
number of private schools receiving little or no public funding, results in more private funding of schooling in 
Argentina than South Africa. However, even in Argentinean public schools there is some private funding, of 
both a direct and an indirect nature. Direct private contributions may occur into a school fund that is 
established, according to provincial policy, to deal with smaller costs relating to such things as building 
maintenance and minor building repairs. Provincial policy specifies that parents and school management may 
jointly determine a small annual sum to be collected from households for each pupil, though payment of this 
sum of money is voluntary. Although national statistics on the extent to which parents pay the annual sum are  
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not produced, it is generally believed that a majority of parents do make the contribution. The end effect is 
thus similar to that of South Africa’s school fees, though the problems in South Africa associated with the 
compulsory nature of the fees is avoided. However, the annual contributions in Argentina are not without 
their own problems, relating largely to occasional community dissatisfaction with the way the school 
administration manages and uses the school fund. Traditionally, indirect household contributions to the 
schooling process in the form of household purchases of textbooks and stationery has been the norm. These 
contributions have been regarded as compulsory, and are hence also comparable to the school fees of the 
South African system. In recent years, and especially in the case of socio-economically disadvantaged areas, 
the responsibility for the direct and indirect contributions have increasingly been shifted from the household 
to the state. Certain provinces (and even the national level) transfer public money into the school fund, and in 
kind provisioning of textbooks, stationery and even school uniforms to the school have become common. 
These interventions have focussed in particular on primary and junior secondary schools. A key question is 
obviously the extent to which the interventions have succeeded in relieving poor households of financial 
burdens which could undermine their access to public schooling. There is currently insufficient research to 
answer this question conclusively, but the available information suggests that most poor households continue 
to carry a financial burden with regard to inputs such as textbooks which is unacceptably high.  
Enrolment levels.  Up until 2006, one year of pre-school, and the first nine years of schooling were 
compulsory, giving a total of ten years of compulsory education. In 2006, schooling up to the twelfth grade 
was declared compulsory, giving thirteen years of compulsory education. Despite this ambitious policy goal 
(most developed countries require considerably fewer than thirteen years of compulsory education), 
Argentina’s enrolment profile is typical for a middle income country, and only slightly better than that of 
South Africa. Around 15% of youths do not enter Grade 9 (according to the pre-2006 policy, all should), 
though very few youths, fewer than 3%, leave school before age 14, the age that more or less corresponds to 
Grade 9 (these figures refer to both the public and private sectors). Around 50% of all youths obtain the 
Grade 12 qualification, which is considerably more than the one-third in South Africa. Clearly, attaining the 
new 2006 policy goal in Argentina will require a massive expansion of the post-Grade 9 schooling system. 
Below, we will discuss the economics of this, taking into account, for instance, the fact that unlike South 
Africa, Argentina applies less stringent criteria for determining who obtains the Grade 12 qualification. The 
fact that the gross enrolment ratio is somewhat lower in Argentina than in South Africa (0.99 against 1.09), 
despite a slightly higher Grade 12 completion rate, is almost certainly attributable to higher repeater rates in 
South Africa (absolute certainty would require some rather detailed analysis of the repeater figures, which for 
most developing countries, including the two countries considered here, are fairly unreliable). The new policy 
targets in Argentina imply a major increase in the gross enrolment ratio (assuming that repetition rates remain 
more or less constant), a change that would undoubtedly have a knock-on effect on other values in Table 1. 
Teacher pay. As we have seen above, teacher salaries in Argentina, which are negotiated between provincial 
unions and provincial governments, differ considerably from one province to another. The highest provincial 
average is over three times greater than the lowest provincial average. Three factors facilitate such large 
differences: the proportion of provincial revenue derived from own provincial taxes, the province’s budgetary 
prioritisation of education relative to other sectors, and the degree to which certain provinces, in particular 
poor ones, receive a grant from the national level that is above average relative to the size of the school-age 
population. The complexities are such that there is not a clear correlation between a province’s level of 
poverty and the provincial teacher salary. In some cases poorer provinces enjoy above average teacher 
salaries, but this is not always the case. The national federation of teacher unions in Argentina has for long 
attempted to bring some standardisation across provinces in teacher salaries, and has to some degree been 
successful with the national government’s adoption of the FONID equalisation fund. However, inter-
provincial salary differences are only part of the reason why teacher income in Argentina is considerably 
more unequal than in South Africa. The way teacher labour is organised in Argentina results in considerable 
inequality. Whilst in South Africa, virtually all teachers are employed full-time to work in one school, in 
Argentina teachers working above the Grade 6 level are paid by the hour, and these hours may be taught 
across several schools. Thus around 20% of teachers in public schools report teaching less than 20 hours per 
week, whilst 25% report teaching 40 or more hours per week. Around 20% of teachers work in more than one 
school, and 6% work in more than two schools (Argentina: MdE, 2006a, and own analysis of Argentina: 
MdE, 2006). This diversity of hours and number of schools is more pronounced at the senior secondary level. 
It is facilitated by the fact that the great majority of public schools, at the primary and secondary levels, offer 
a morning and an afternoon shift to different groups of pupils.   
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Quantity of teachers. Relative to the number of pupils, Argentina is 2.5 times better endowed with teachers 
than South Africa, at least in quantitative terms. The figures in Table 1 provide an idea of how this is 
possible: an Argentinean teacher costs three-quarters as much as a South African teacher (relative to GDP per 
capita), and GDP per capita is 1.4 times as high in Argentina as it is in South Africa. Moreover, the design of 
the policies that determine the staff establishments of schools in Argentina is more likely to encourage the 
hiring of new teachers than the design of the corresponding policy in South Africa. (The staff establishment 
in Argentina is referred to as the POF, an abbreviation of Plantas Orgánico Funcionales). Firstly, in 
Argentina the policy is entirely provincial, so the setting of absolute pupil/teacher ratios in the policy is a 
possibility and indeed a logical thing to do. In South Africa the policy, which is national, cannot do this as 
budgets are not controlled nationally, and the alternative of province-specific pupil/teacher ratios established 
either within the national policy or in separate provincial policies has up till now not been explored. Though 
Argentinean provinces are obviously subject to the normal budgetary constraints, the existence of absolute 
pupil/teacher ratios in their teacher allocation policies creates a propensity towards prioritising the hiring of 
new teachers whenever enrolments rise. Secondly, the provincial policies in Argentina dealing with teacher 
allocation cover an extraordinarily large variety of post types, up to around 300 in the case of one province. 
This encourages specialisation in the teaching profession, but not a culture of multi-tasking. This tends to 
result in a perceived demand that is higher than what would have been the case if job descriptions were more 
open and flexible. Lastly, it is relatively common in Argentina for provinces to grant posts in excess of the 
norm in the policy.  
Contact time. In Argentina, a lower average daily contact time for pupils (partly a result of the double 
shifting of schools) and a shorter school year result in a total annual contact time for the average pupil that is 
around three-quarters of what it is in South Africa. The shorter contact time experienced by Argentinean 
pupils, combined with the fact that the ‘intensity of teacher utilisation’ (the ratio of the pupil’s contact hours 
to the teacher’s contact hours) is lower than in South Africa, results in an average cost per teacher contact 
hour that is considerably higher than that in South Africa (89 versus 58 USD in purchasing power parity 
terms). But the cost per contact hour figure is obviously a rather limited indicator of the unit cost of the 
teacher service because it assumes that this service is only provided through contact hours. What it does not 
take into account is the educational value offered by the 22% of teachers who do not teach (in South Africa 
this figure is a mere 4%). It should be remembered that we are only referring to teachers who are attached to 
institutions. Teachers attached to administration offices are excluded. In Argentina, around 4% of the around 
475,000 schools-based teachers are in school management positions (this percentage is thus the same as in 
South Africa). A further 11%, approximately, are on various forms of paid leave at any one point in time. 
Leave policies are considerably more generous in Argentina than in South Africa, for instance there are 
separate allowances for leave days relating to personal illness, and for leave days relating to the illness of a 
family member (together these two allowances come to around 45 days per year, against an average of 13 
days of sick leave per year in South Africa). A further 7% of Argentinean teachers occupy support functions 
providing, mainly, classroom-based support (in the lower grades) and counselling and social support outside 
the classroom.  
Despite the fact that the intensity of teacher utilisation is lower in Argentina (0.63 against 0.72 in South 
Africa) and the fact that such a high proportion of teachers in Argentina do not teach, the sheer size of the 
teacher workforce in Argentina allows for the average class size to be almost half of what it is in South Africa 
(26 against 47). In Argentina, 1 in 27 adults aged 15 to 64 is employed as a teacher of some kind (in public or 
private service) – in South Africa the ratio is 1 in 72. Such a large difference reflects a fundamentally 
different approach in the two societies towards the teaching profession.  
The comparison in a nutshell 
There are key similarities between the two countries  with respect to their schooling systems. Both are 
characterised by national-provincial tensions over how resources should be allocated to the education process. 
Both spend a similar percentage of GDP on schooling, and both experience a similar demographic demand 
for schooling (though both of these variables display slightly more favourable values in the case of 
Argentina). However, two structural differences result in strongly divergent approaches to the production of 
schooling. The first key difference, put simply, is that South Africa has fewer highly paid teachers, whilst 
Argentina has more not-so-highly paid teachers (here we are referring to teacher pay relative to GDP per 
capita). This difference is rooted in the histories of the two societies. In South Africa, teacher pay became 
standardised at the highest existing level in the strong drive for national unity following the fall of apartheid.  
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This, in a sense, forced the post-apartheid government to continue with the rather unfavourable aggregate 
pupil/teacher ratios that had existed under apartheid. In Argentina, a long history of relatively powerful 
provinces has fragmented the teacher labour market, the result being a highly inequitable distribution of 
teacher pay. This inequity is not necessarily undesirable. Higher teacher salaries in provinces with a poor 
human capital endowment can help to bring about greater equity in the distribution of pupil performance. The 
second key difference relates to physical infrastructure, specifically the phenomenon of multi-shift schools in 
Argentina (this phenomenon is widespread in Latin America). This places a very real constraint on the length 
of the school day for pupils.  
These structural differences have implications for where the schooling systems need to place their emphasis if 
quality schooling is to be offered. Relatively large classes and relatively long working days (in addition to a 
long working year) in South Africa imply that administrative and logistical support by non-teacher staff (who 
are paid considerably less than teachers) to support teachers seems important. Teaching time simply costs 
society too much, and is too scarce, to allow for the use of teaching time for non-teaching tasks. Clearly, 
pedagogical methods need to be strongly focussed on how to educate large classes. To some extent, the 
problem of large classes could be reduced through Argentinean-style double-shifting of classes, especially at 
the secondary school level where the curriculum is more subject-oriented. However, much would depend on 
the interest amongst teachers to exchange extended teaching hours for lower class sizes. 
In Argentina, on the other hand, the challenge lies in compressing quality learning into fairly limited pockets 
of time. Some of this need for compression could be removed if the school year were longer – the alternative 
of lengthening the school day is clearly difficult. Opportunities for addressing these challenges need to be 
found in the very low overall pupil/teacher ratio in Argentina, which allows, for instance, for remedial 
support to smaller groups of pupils.  
5  Promoting a more empirically informed policy process. 
The extent to which economics of education is used as a tool to improve policy design and implementation 
depends strongly on the status of research in general within the policymaking cycle. Current thinking can be 
summed up as follows. Financing of research into education must be adequate – as an example of developed 
country practice, in the United Kingdom this financing is estimated to be around 0.5% of overall spending on 
education. Institutional arrangements should be such that a research monopoly by one organisation is 
avoided, and should promote multi-disciplinary work within a medium to long-range framework developed or 
endorsed by the government, and linked to data collection cycles. Considerable emphasis needs to be placed 
on bridging the divide between researchers and policymakers, through intermediary institutions that can 
quality assure and synthesise the range of research outputs, and through a better focus within much of the 
research on the policy specificities of the education sector (Argentina: DiNIECE, 2006).  
DiNIECE, a unit of the Argentinean Ministry of Education responsible for education statistics, evaluation of 
the education system and research coordination, has evaluated the education research situation in the country 
and recommended a number of strategies for improving the use of research in policymaking. On the side of 
research production, the Ministry should improve the accessibility of official data, should promote more 
active participation by teacher unions, and should make its research needs clearer. With regard to research 
dissemination, the point is made that planners and managers in the public system often find it easier to access 
foreign texts than locally produced texts, partly because foreign texts are more readily accessed in traditional 
formats such as books, whilst local texts are often disseminated by the less familiar medium of the internet. 
Poor skills in the use of the internet, and poor packaging of information on the internet, rather than the 
availability of the technology itself, appear to be the key problems. Moreover, insufficient focus on concrete 
policy solutions, and inaccessible jargon in many research texts also stand in the way of better use of research 
in policymaking (Argentina: DiNIECE, 2006). Though the South African Ministry of Education has not 
published its own account of the research in policymaking challenges, it seems safe to say that the South 
African challenges are similar to the Argentinean ones, though the challenge of building sufficient individual 
and institutional research capacity is perhaps greater in the case of South Africa, given how recently obstacles 
such as race-based exclusions in universities were removed.   
There appear to be valuable institutional lessons emerging from both countries. DiNIECE has started making 
whole datasets available to researchers as downloads off its website, notably the dataset of the 2004 Teacher 
Census. DiNIECE’s online database of references to and summaries of around 600 locally produced research  
  14 
texts, based on periodic surveys of research institutions across the country, also deserves mention (though 
extremely few texts deal with the economics of education). In South Africa, the Education Labour Relations 
Council (ELRC), which brings together government and the teacher unions, has devoted a considerable 
portion of its funding (derived both from government and union membership fees) towards research projects 
designed jointly by both parties and focussing on teachers.  
6  The challenge of improving educational quality 
The outputs of schooling in South Africa are well below what could be expected, given the levels of spending 
on the sector. This problem has become particularly evident in the regional SACMEQ programme, which has 
indicated that with respect to primary schooling South Africa performs considerably worse, in terms of 
standardised test scores, than countries with much lower per capita education spending, and poorer 
populations, for instance Kenya and Tanzania (Ratsatsi, 2005). Whilst average pupil performance in the 
Argentinean schooling system is undoubtedly better than that in the South African one (we shall see this 
below), quality problems are evident in the Argentinean system as well. Argentina’s 15 year olds performed 
substantially worse than those of Chile in the 2006 PISA science test, and the same as those in Brazil, despite 
the fact that spending per pupil at the public secondary level is about twice as high in Argentina as it is in 
Brazil (OECD, 2007, UNESCO, 2007: 350). Outputs in both systems are notably unequal, with both 
countries displaying exceptionally high between-school inequalities relative to their regional counterparts, 
and relative to the rest of the world (Van der Berg, 2005; OECD, 2007: 171).  
Economics of education has proven to be most useful within the policy process in areas where, firstly, the 
education policy challenge lent itself to economic theory and, secondly, there was sufficiently relevant data 
available within the education sector. One such area has been the productivity of the school, where theories of 
production and sample-based data collections covering both background variables (relating to schools, pupils 
and teachers) and pupil test scores have converged into the so-called education production function, which 
attempts to assess the internal efficiency of schooling. Specifically, the efficiency of increasing the level of 
different inputs as a means to improving outputs is assessed.  
Education production function studies have tended to yield less policy information than was expected. Partly, 
this is due to the fact that, especially in developing countries, the available datasets were not designed for this 
kind of study, and are far from ideal. Specifically, cross-sectional data, as opposed to time series data, impose 
considerable limitations on the analysis, and typically the available data lack important information regarding 
school management practices and teacher human capital (though with regard to this last point, there are 
exceptions, as we shall see below). To some extent the methodological rigour of available studies is 
questioned, and very often there is a problem in packaging the findings of these studies in such a manner that 
they make sense to a wider audience, including policymakers. Despite these difficulties, there is keen interest 
within the education planning community in taking this type of analysis forward (see for instance UNESCO, 
2005: 64 and OECD, 2007: 264), partly as a result of recent findings of how important schooling quality, 
relative to schooling quantity, is for country development (Hanushek and Woessman, 2007). In South Africa, 
the Ministry of Education was actively involved in a production function analysis undertaken by Bhorat and 
Oosthuizen (2006) (though, as the researchers themselves pointed out, the availability of just school-level and 
not pupil-level data seriously limited the study).  
To what extent have production function studies succeeded in shedding light on the school production 
process, and in shaping policies dealing with educational quality, in our two countries? A number of studies 
have taken place using data from both countries. With regard to the teacher input, Santos (2007), using 
Argentina’s 2000 PISA data, concludes that teacher qualifications exert no significant impact on pupil 
performance, though positive teacher behaviour in the form of less absenteeism and more professional 
commitment (as described by the school principal) does. Gustafsson (2007), using data from UNESCO’s 
regional SACMEQ programme, draws similar conclusions for South Africa. SACMEQ offers an exceptional 
opportunity to examine the role of teacher human capital in producing pupil learning as the programme 
includes a teacher testing element. Unfortunately, union opposition to the teacher test resulted in South Africa 
being one of two countries (the other is Mauritius), out of the total of fourteen participants, which did not 
carry out this test. Analysis of the countries that did include the teacher test reveal that in the four SACMEQ 
countries where the teacher test results did display a significant and positive association with pupil 
performance in a production function, these results were more significant than teacher resources (Lee, Zuze 
and Ross, 2005). A rather crude production function model was run by us for Namibia (a country which to a  
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large degree shares South Africa’s educational history), and the teacher test score variable was found to 
display the second-greatest association (after the school infrastructure variable), as measured by standardised 
slope coefficients, with the pupil test score (see Appendix for details). This confirms the problematic nature 
of production function studies that exclude the teacher competency variable, and the importance of having 
unions onboard important research programmes, especially in countries with politically powerful teacher 
unions (such as South Africa and Argentina).  
Class sizes beyond certain threshold points can be expected to have a negative impact on pupil performance. 
Santos (2007) identifies the threshold class size for Argentina, in around Grade 9, as being 32 (the 
methodology behind this finding is not explained however). South African studies have tended to find class 
size a weak lever for performance improvements, though one suspects this is more due to problems around 
the specification of class size in the models (specifically, the failure to explore threshold values) as opposed 
to the inherent non-significance of class size. Here South African analysts may have been overly trusting of 
findings from other systems, with far lower average and high-end class sizes, indicating that class size is not a 
problem. It seems improbable that having more than, say, 60 pupils in a class at the primary level will not 
have a detrimental impact on learning. The largest classes in South Africa are large even by regional 
standards – the 2000 SACMEQ dataset indicates that 10% of South Africa’s Grade 6 pupils were in classes 
with more than 58 pupils, whilst the corresponding value was 36 in Botswana, 50 in Zambia, Kenya and 
Uganda, and 52 in Namibia (but 60 in Tanzania) (own analysis of IIEP, 2004). Reducing the average class 
size is often unaffordable (and the benefits often do not justify the costs), so this often verges on useless 
policy advice. However, where between-school teacher distribution problems (despite equity-oriented 
policies in this regard) and poor within-school allocation of teacher time seem to be the problem (our own 
analysis suggests this is true in South Africa), this is certainly worth pointing out to policymakers.  
Table 1 indicated that the contact time offered per pupil is around 25% lower in Argentina than what it is in 
South Africa. The 2006 international PISA report (OECD, 2007: 260) points to Argentina’s contact time 
being below the international average. On the basis of a multi-country production function analysis, the same 
report (OECD, 2007: 271) suggests that Argentina stands to gain more in terms of pupil performance than all 
other countries (save one) from an increase in the level of contact time. However, our foregoing discussion of 
Argentina’s schooling policies indicated that increasing pupil contact time is problematic due to the 
dependence of the system on the double-shifting of schools. The political will to remove double-shifting, at 
least at the primary level, is strong, as evidenced in the 2006 National Education Law, but the physical 
infrastructure cost of this would be immense (though, as we mentioned before, lengthening the school year is 
a more viable option). Gustafsson (2007) finds that an increase in contact time is likely to improve pupil 
performance in South Africa too. In South Africa, this is perhaps more feasible as an immediate policy option 
due the virtual absence of double-shifting.  
In her production function, Santos (2007) isolates the effects of books in the home, and points to their 
significant positive association with pupil performance as a justification for better investments in the media 
collections of schools, in particular those schools serving poorer pupils. This seems to be a useful treatment 
of this home background variable, which in many production function studies is simply subsumed into the 
socio-economic status index.  
Turning to the governance of the schooling system, Eskeland and Filmer (2002) use data from the 
Argentinean Ministry of Education’s Operativo Nacional de Educación (ONE) monitoring programme to 
explore, through the use of a production function, the role of school autonomy and community participation 
in improving pupil performance. Even when controlling for province and whether a school is public or not, 
they find that autonomy and participation, when combined, enhance performance significantly. The policy 
conclusion is both that greater school autonomy amongst public schools, with respect to such matters as 
textbook selection and the evaluation of teachers is valuable, and that for the value to be realised, autonomy 
should be combined with community empowerment in the governance of the school. Eskeland and Filmer’s 
model is well suited for analysing South African policy issues, especially given the strong policy emphasis 
since 1994 on, firstly, community participation (school governing bodies are elected every three years in a 
highly publicised national process) and, secondly, the granting of management autonomy after schools have 
requested this, and proven that they have the requisite management capacity. The quality effects of these 
prominent interventions have as yet not been analysed.    
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Crouch and Mabogoane (1998), on the basis of their production function analysis of South African school-
level data, implicitly warn policymakers against attaching too much importance to policy reform, relative to 
better management practices within the existing policy architecture. They emphasise that from a planning 
perspective, what the production function does not tell us could be as important as what the model does tell 
us, and appropriately title their paper ‘When the residuals matter more than the coefficients’. Their warning is 
a necessary and insufficiently repeated reminder for authors of policy recommendations, and one that is likely 
to be supported by teachers and school managers suffering from policy reform fatigue. As an example of a 
potentially fatigue-inducing policy change, the grade definitions of what constitutes a primary and a 
secondary school have changed twice in Argentina in the last 15 years, once in 1993, and again in 2006. In 
South Africa, the new post-apartheid curriculum introduced in 1997 had to be revised in 2002. One is not 
saying that inappropriate policies should not be changed, but rather that the policy formulation process should 
be sufficiently rigorous to minimise the risk of declaring new policies that require revision after just some 
years.  
One obvious limitation with respect to the supply of relevant studies is that so little use is made of what is 
arguably the datasets most suited for production function analysis, namely the national datasets emerging 
from the sample-based pupil performance monitoring programmes ONE (in Argentina) and Systemic 
Evaluation (in South Africa). These datasets are derived from pupil tests and background questionnaires 
which, unlike those of the international programmes, are tailored for the national situation. Moreover, though 
they do not provide a time series (different schools and pupils provide the data in each run), they are more or 
less consistent over time in terms of their structure, thus facilitating an analysis of changes in the production 
function over the years. Though Eskeland and Filmer (2002) use a single ONE dataset to examine autonomy 
and participation (they do not examine the school production process in its entirety), in general the potential 
of the ONE datasets to reveal new policy information through the simultaneous consideration of a range of 
explanatory variables, as is done in the production function analysis, remains unrealised. In South Africa, the 
official reports of the Systemic Evaluation have included some input-output analysis, but not the application 
of the typical production function approach (see South Africa: DoE, 2005).  
A further limitation has been a lack of policy specificity in the available studies, or separate and 
complementary policy analyses that translate the production function findings to specific recommendations 
regarding policy changes (or policy retention) and budgets. To some extent, Gustafsson (2007) provides 
budget specificity, but in general policy is either not dealt with at all, or is dealt with at a level that is too 
superficial to allow for direct inroads into the policy debates.  
What are the policies that economists (and other researchers) may hope to influence with regard to pupil 
performance? Ideally, perhaps, there should be a national policy that outlines the precise strategies that 
should be followed to improve performance, based on the findings of research from a variety of disciplines. 
Such a policy is lacking in both our countries, and is in fact rare elsewhere. Instead, Argentina lays down a 
general strategy in its 2006 National Education Law (Argentina: MdE, 2006a) for achieving quality education 
that includes, for instance, additional funding from the national level for schools serving poor communities 
and incentives for teachers to teach in such schools. South Africa’s quality enhancement strategy is largely 
centred around its Integrated Quality Management System (IQMS) programme (South Africa: ELRC, 2003) 
aimed at promoting schools-based professional appraisals of teachers. The Ministry of Education’s strategic 
plan also outlines a variety of quality enhancement interventions (South Africa: DoE, 2007a). What is absent 
in the policies of both countries in a sense of magnitudes and trade-offs, matters that economics of education 
is reputedly good at dealing with. Instead, the policies tend to follow a ‘wishlist’ approach of mentioning all 
(or a large variety of) conceivable interventions, without a sufficient sense of hierarchy and inter-
dependencies. The opportunities for economics of education (as well as other disciplines) to contribute more 
concretely to policies on improving educational quality seem wide open.  
The way in which information on school quality is disseminated through society has important implications 
for the extent to which human capital development debates, and hence debates about country development 
and poverty alleviation, can be popularised, and school accountability loops can be strengthened. Politically, 
South Africa and Argentina have both shown signs of being committed to sufficient dissemination of this 
information. However, in both countries realities lag behind the political commitment. South Africa’s 
Systemic Evaluation has, in its eight-year history, only had three runs, each covering one grade. With respect 
to frequency, Argentina’s ONE is better, with four grades (3, 6, 9 and 12) being covered every second year. 
However, when it comes to packaging and information dissemination, both monitoring programmes lag  
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behind, for instance, Brazil’s SAEB/Prova Brasil, which has begun to disseminate user-friendly school-
specific report cards (see http://www.inep.gov.br).   
7  The challenge of expanding secondary schooling 
In both countries there is political interest in broadening participation in secondary schooling, both as a 
means towards greater social equity, and to improve productivity in the workforce. The speed with which to 
expand the education system at the secondary level, and the type of secondary education to focus on, are 
specific policy questions where it is reasonable to seek at least a part of the answer in economically-focussed 
analysis of the data. Regrettably, models that can assist in this area have been hard to come by, and despite 
the obvious importance of the policy area, there is much less economics of education guidance than there is in 
the area of school productivity. Part of the explanation for this state of affairs lies in the need to take into 
account country-specific institutional and labour market factors, making the universal models economists are 
fond of elusive. Hoenack (1996: 332), in an overview of the state of economics of education in developing 
countries refers to policy advice on the relative prioritisation of different education programmes as ‘our 
field’s most difficult task’. Here we attempt to deal with some of this difficulty.  
It is worth first sketching the enrolment and attainment picture for Argentina and South Africa in some 
further detail. In Figure 1 below we focus on average years of schooling completed (left-hand vertical axis) 
and percentage of the population enrolled in school (right-hand axis) by age across all schools, public and 
private. The picture across the two countries is not that different, but South Africa’s curves lie to the right of 
Argentina’s. This reflects the fact that the policy-stipulated age of entry into schools is one year later in South 
Africa than in Argentina (age 7 against age 6). What is also notable is that although overall there is more 
enrolment relative to the population in South Africa (compare the areas under the two enrolment curves), 
attainment amongst those aged 20 and above falls short of Argentina’s by just under a year. This is partly 
indicative of inefficiencies in the South African system in the form of higher levels of repetition. But partly 
this is the result of lags: South Africa’s secondary level enrolment has increased by 12% in the 2000 to 2006 
period, against just 4% in Argentina. A data problem deserves mention. Whilst South Africa’s intra-census 
and sample-based General Household Survey (GHS) covers the entire country, and is thus sufficient for the 
monitoring of key education trends, the equivalent survey in Argentina, the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH) covers only around 60% of the population, namely that part considered to be urban, and one is 
therefore forced to turn to census data to obtain a full and reliable picture of enrolment ratios.  
Figure 1: Enrolment and attainment patterns 
 
Source: GHS 2006 (South Africa) and Censo 2001 (Argentina). Note: The average attainment curves should be read 
against the left-hand axis, and the enrolment curves against the right-hand axis.   
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A graph such as the one above allows us to gauge the gaps between actual enrolments and enrolment targets 
in the policy. South Africa is close to achieving its aim of schooling for all children up to age 15. The 
enrolment curve should move up at the age 15 point to 100% (currently it is around 5% short of this target). 
From an efficiency perspective, the enrolment curve for older youths (of, say, 20 and above) should move 
down considerably, through better controls of grade repetition. Argentina’s 2006 National Education Law 
establishes a highly ambitious enrolment target of compulsory schooling up to the last grade of secondary 
schooling, in other words up to the twelfth grade. The law does not lay down a timeframe for achieving this 
target, however.  Figure  1  illustrates how ambitious the Argentinean policy is. Assuming there were no 
repetition, the enrolment curve would need to move up at the age 18 level by 35 percentage points. However, 
if we make the assumption at least some grade repetition will be permitted, then the enrolment curve might 
need to move up at ages beyond 18 as well.  
The following graph provides a cross-country view of the compulsory schooling situation. Each point 
represents one of 173 countries. The horizontal axis represents the compulsory years of schooling required by 
law. For most countries, this means that children must attend school within a certain age range, for instance 
ages 7 to 15 in South Africa, giving nine years of compulsory schooling. However, for some countries, such 
as Argentina after 2006, this means compulsory attendance for a number of grades (Grades 1 to 12 in 
Argentina). Clearly, if repetition is allowed, then the second approach implies more pupil years of 
compulsory schooling on average than the first approach. The vertical axis represents school life expectancy 
for primary to secondary schooling, as calculated by UIS. School life expectancy is the number of years that 
the average pupil is expected to attend school – to calculate this, the age-specific enrolment ratios in a recent 
year are used, meaning that if attendance is improving over time, then the school life expectancy will to some 
degree be an under-estimation of true expectations. One would expect school life expectancy to increase in 
line with a country’s compulsory years of schooling, though school life expectancy cannot serve as a precise 
measure of policy compliance here, as it is an average, and does not tell us how many children do not 
complete the compulsory number of years.   
Figure 2: Policy-stipulated and actual years of schooling 
 
Source: UNESCO: UIS (2008). Note: As far as possible, values corresponding to 2006 were used.  
Figure 2 indicates that most countries in fact offer more years of schooling on average than what their policy 
stipulates is the minimum – all the countries above the dotted line belong to this group. Argentina (until 2006 
– see ‘ARG 1’) and South Africa were moreover slightly better than the norm (see the solid trendline) when it 
came to exceeding their minima. In both countries school life expectancy is just under twelve years. In 
moving to 12 years (at least) of compulsory schooling, Argentina (see ‘ARG 2’) has in 2007 joined the set of 
just three countries with such a target – the three countries are Netherlands, Germany and Belgium.  
The logical point of departure if we want to deal with these policy issues from an economic perspective, is the 
human capital model. Very briefly, according to this model the returns to investments in education are  
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sufficiently high to make it worthwhile for all households to invest in education privately. However, because 
many, in particular the poor, are not able to raise the finance for the educational investment on a private basis, 
and for a number of other socio-political reasons, the state takes on the role of principal financier of the 
education system. In the last decade, the empirical demonstration of the human capital model has undergone 
some dramatic changes, largely due to improved availability of comparable statistics on the quality of 
schooling. A number of analyses, and notably that of Hanushek and Woessman (2007), have overturned the 
more traditional notion that a country benefits economically from investing in more years of education for its 
citizens. Instead, the quality of schooling, which is relatively independent of years of education, is the key 
determinant of economic growth. This evidence is vital for education planning, though translating this 
knowledge into policy specifics, for instance the optimum growth path of secondary schooling, is not easy.  
With respect to the level of human capital in general terms (as opposed to knowledge and skills relating to 
specific occupations) the greatest analytical challenge lies on the side of the supply of human capital. The 
demand for higher levels of human capital in the labour market seems sufficiently unbounded to not be a key 
concern for the analyst. In any event, human capital is so intrinsically difficult to grow that it is unlikely that a 
sudden over-supply would exceed demand. Though this is an over-simplification of the demand for human 
capital, it seems safe to assume that our attention should be focussed on maximising the supply of human 
capital.  
On the supply side, there are three key factors: number of educated individuals, the quality of the education 
received, and the cost of providing the education. Importantly, generating new human capital has been shown 
to depend strongly on the existing human capital (essentially parents and teachers), and only weakly on 
expenditure per pupil. Expenditure is thus a variable that acts largely as a constraining factor on quantitative 
expansions to the education system, and only to a lesser degree as a factor linked to quality. Quality 
improvements, especially beyond certain expenditure thresholds, are to a large degree dependent on the kinds 
of process and managerial improvements discussed in a previous section. There is in other words not a strong 
argument for the existence of a trade-off between quality and quantity in education. All of these assertions are 
to some extent debatable, but at least for countries such as Argentina and South Africa, this appears to be 
broadly how the human capital model works.  
One line of research that seems to offer a bridge between the theory of the human capital model and the 
specifics of expanding the secondary school system is that dealing with the rates of return to different levels 
of education. In South Africa, considerable effort has gone towards the calculation of Mincerian rates of 
return. Keswell and Poswell (2002) provide a summary of recent studies, as well as their own rate of return 
estimates. They find that income returns to additional years of schooling below Grade 12 are negligible, and 
that the South African data consistently contradict findings from elsewhere (and disseminated prominently by 
the World Bank) that returns diminish the higher the level of education, and in particular that primary 
schooling displays the highest returns (see especially Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). Interestingly, 
Coatz and Woyecheszen (2007), in their analysis of Argentinean data, also find the reverse of the generally 
accepted pattern, with rates of return being greatest at the tertiary level, and lowest at the primary level. These 
are crucial empirical matters in education planning, partly because a higher rate of return for primary 
schooling has been used as one justification (though by no means the only or even the strongest justification) 
for the Education for All (EFA) focus on expanding primary schooling. There are a number of complications, 
some widely acknowledged, some less so, with rates of return to education analyses. Amongst the better 
known is the fact that rates of return estimates mostly do not take into account externalities – benefits to 
society as a whole, beyond the benefits to the individual – or the upward effect on the rates of the abilities of 
individuals. Moreover, rates of return estimates are based on historical education and income trends, which 
might not accurately reflect the situation in the future or (in the case of education) even in the present. What 
is often less clear in these analyses is whether the estimates are meant to throw light on the behaviour of 
households, or provide direction to public policy dealing with the prioritisation of education levels or 
programmes. For the former, private rates of return are relevant, and for the latter social rates of return. The 
distinction is often not sufficiently clear in rates of return analyses. Whilst the two sets of estimates may often 
display similar trends, completely blurring the distinction, as is often done, makes drawing policy conclusions 
difficult (Powdthavee and Vignoles, 2006, provide a brief discussion of the problem).  
The finding of exceptionally low returns to primary schooling and (particularly in the case of South Africa) to 
most of secondary schooling needs to be interpreted in relation to how the two schooling systems issue 
qualifications. In both countries, qualifications with currency in the labour market are only issued at the end  
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of Grade 12. In South Africa, the qualification is issued after the pupil passes national examinations. In 
Argentina, examinations set by the school, and subject to only limited national standardisation, are used. An 
international comparison such as that permitted by the World Education Indicators (WEI) programme 
(UNESCO, 2002) reveals that both South Africa and Argentina are unusual in the fact that they issue 
qualifications only at the end of the schooling process. Most countries (in the WEI) have at least one other 
qualification issued at a level below the Grade 12 level. In Argentina around half and in South Africa around 
two-thirds of youths leave the schooling system and enter the labour market with no qualification, and in the 
case of Argentina the qualifications from different schools are not fully comparable. This suggests that by 
world standards qualifications, of any type, would be relatively scarce in the Argentinean and South Africa 
labour markets. This is likely to produce some unusual rates of return patterns. Specifically, education below 
the Grade 12 level is unlikely to be valued highly, given that employers depend on qualifications as a signal 
of the value of the prospective employee.  
But even if we bring institutional factors to bear on our interpretation of rates of return, the question remains 
how these estimates could be used to plan quantitative expansions in the education system. One approach, 
used by Verspoor and Bregman (2007: 62) with respect to secondary schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa, is to 
use increases over time in the rate of return to secondary schooling as an indication of the need to expand this 
sub-sector. However, this requires rates that are comparable over time, something which we seem not to have 
in the case of our two countries. 
It appears as if a more fruitful line of analysis to deal with our secondary schooling policy issue is to examine 
cross-country patterns with respect to the quantity, quality and expenditure variables at the secondary level. 
We acknowledge that this approach comes with its own limitations, including the temptation to regard trends 
relative to level of development as being in some sense normal and optimal. However, we still believe it 
offers some key policy insights. 
A crucial data challenge if one wants to compare secondary schooling across countries is finding appropriate 
indicators of the quantity of secondary schooling offered per country. Mingat and Tan (1998: 11) use school 
life expectancy, and find a noticeable correlation between this variable and GDP per capita. However, 
because school life expectancy includes years repeated, and because repetition is high in many schooling 
systems, this variable does not lend itself to policy analyses where the concern is the proportion of pupils who 
complete secondary schooling – this concern is explicit in Argentina’s 2006 National Education Law, and it 
is also a concern that is often expressed in South African policy debates. In fact, the school life expectancy 
variable is of limited value even if the concern is keeping pupils in school up to a certain age – here age-
specific enrolment ratios are needed. 
Ideally what we needed was the percentage of youths who at some point successfully complete the final grade 
of secondary school. However, there is no cross-country dataset which includes information on successful 
graduation. We therefore had to settle for a fairly close proxy to this, namely the percentage of youths who 








using the following formula (we are not aware of this statistic, often referred to as a completion rate, having 
been calculated on the basis of UIS data and for secondary schooling elsewhere): 
 
Eg is enrolment in the final secondary grade (specifically, the last grade of ISCED 3A) in a year, Rg
                                                       
4 An alternative to the UIS dataset, which is derived from MoE reports, is the World Bank’s collection of education data 
derived from household sample surveys (see http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/edattain/). That collection 
covers 93 countries, of which 51 are low income countries and none are high income countries. The World Bank collection, 
whilst not as comprehensive in terms of countries as the UIS dataset, may well offer more accurate statistics given that the 
population and education variables are collected simultaneously. For our study, however, the UIS data appeared more 
suitable. 
 is the 
number of repeaters in the same grade in the same year, and P  is the size of the population cohort 
corresponding to the final secondary grade. To obtain P, we used the UIS population figure corresponding to 
the whole secondary level, and divided it by the number of grades at this level. In other words, we assumed 
that all population age cohorts at the secondary level were of the same size. One key problem with the  
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secondary completion statistic we obtain is that a few countries have very large technical and vocational 
education and training (TVET) sub-sectors at the ISCED 3 level which are not taken into account with the 
above calculation – one notable example is the Czech Republic. As TVET is not as consistently divided 
across grades as mainstream secondary schooling, the data do not allow an easy incorporation of TVET into 
the calculation. However, we acknowledge the possibility that further examination of the data might allow 
one to arrive at a better c value, which would improve the accuracy of the analysis that follows.  
The next graph illustrates the trend across level of country development for our completion statistic, plus four 
other statistics describing secondary schooling. School life expectancy is as calculated by UIS, and increases 
with level of development, in a concave fashion. This occurs despite the fact that repetition decreases. (The 
low  R
2  value for repetition is to be expected, given the considerable measurement and data collection 
problems with this variable.). What is noteworthy is that the R
2 for the completion curve is less than the R
2 for 
the school life expectancy curve. This is almost certainly in part attributable to problems with the calculation 
of our completion ratio. However, it is possible that the difference in the R
2 values is also attributable to the 
fact that as they develop, countries pay more attention to expanding schooling in a general sense, than to 
ensuring a consistent increase in the number of pupils who complete school or reach key exit points. Public 
expenditure per pupil at the secondary level (in PPP USD terms) displays a remarkably strong correlation 
with GDP per capita, which we can interpret as an indication of the seriousness with which countries expand 
total enrolments and total expenditure, even if completion of schooling cycles and educational quality are 
goals reached with less success. Finally, ‘Score’ reflects the trend with regard to 40 countries (of which 25 
non-OECD) for which we were able to obtain reasonably comparable secondary level average mathematics 
scores, using the TIMSS 2003 (Grade 8), PISA 2000 and PISA 2003 (both fifteen year olds) datasets. We 
used countries that participated in more than one programme as bridges to adjust all results to the PISA scale. 
The correlation between the mathematics score and GDP per capita is relatively strong, yielding an R
2 
Figure 3: Secondary schooling variables and country development 
of 0.50. 




Source: UNESCO: UIS (2008); OECD (2001); OECD (2004); IEA (2004); International Monetary Fund (2008). Note: As 
far as possible, UIS values corresponding to 2004 were used. Number of countries varied from 40 for ‘Score’, to between 
123 and 173 for the other variables. The trendlines are based on all available countries, even countries with GDP per 
capita exceeding 20,000.   
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The fact that the enrolment curves, namely ‘Completion’ and ‘School life’, display stronger initial growth 
than pupil performance, as represented by ‘Score’, seems to reflect the relative ease with which changes to 
the enrolment patterns can be brought about. Sudden performance improvements would appear to be much 
less normal (though more on this below).    
The above trendlines provide a picture of how one can expect variables relevant to secondary schooling to 
move. The next table provides figures specific to our two countries, and for middle income countries in 
general. Both South Africa and Argentina are countries with high school life expectancy values relative to 
their level of development, partly due to above average levels of grade repetition. They also display above 
average completion of secondary schooling (‘Completion’), though the difference is only marginal in the case 
of South Africa. The expenditure per pupil level for South Africa stands out as somewhat low. This pattern is 
to a large degree a product of relatively high equality between primary and secondary level expenditure per 
pupil (the primary level figure appears somewhat high in an international comparison). Argentina’s 
mathematics score, despite the problems mentioned earlier, emerges as average in this analysis. South 
Africa’s score, on the other hand, is well below what it should be, and reflects a serious human capital 
problem standing in the way of development. To a large degree, the problem is an inheritance from the 
apartheid system’s undisguised suppression of educational standards (in particular with regard to 
mathematics) in public schools serving black pupils, though it should be noted that even historically white 
schools do not fare well in international comparisons. The remarkable disjuncture between South Africa’s 
level of overall development and the level of the country’s human capital (as demonstrated by statistics like 
these) suggest that policy impacts might be abnormal. Specifically, it seems reasonable to assume that more 
rapid test score improvements should be possible in South Africa than in a low income country with a similar 
level of pupil performance, given the greater availability of public funding, institutional capital and at least 
pockets of high-level human capital.  





Africa  Argentina 
School life expectancy  11.1  12.0  11.9 
Repeaters  6.3  14.2  11.6 
Completion  45.0  45.7  56.0 
Expenditure  1,405  1,303  1,729 
Score  389  205  389 
 
One should keep in mind that completion figures for South Africa and Argentina in Table 2 indicate the 
proportion of youths who get to participate in Grade 12, not the proportion of youths who successfully obtain 
the Grade 12 qualification. As noted earlier, only around 50% and 33% of youths in Argentina and South 
Africa respectively have been graduating in recent years. (The discrepancy between the 45.7 figure for South 
Africa in the above table, and the 50% mentioned in an earlier section is partly attributable to the difference 
in years. The above table refers to 2004.) 
The associations between the variables discussed above were examined, and for policy purposes, the most 
useful regression model appeared to be the one with the following form:  
( ) ε β β α + + + = Repeaters GDPperCap Completion 2 1ln  
The model outputs are as follows: 
Table 3: Completion model results 
  Coefficient  t-stat 
ln(GDPperCap)  .0789565**  4.84 
Repeaters  -.0106672**  -3.52 
Intercept  -.2311544  -1.56 
Number of observations  116 
F  28 
R 0.333 
2 
Dependent variable  Completion 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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The model allows us to predict the percentage of youths completing the final secondary grade on the basis of 
two clearly relevant variables, level of country development (as measured by GDP per capita in USD PPP) 
and level of repetition. As one would expect, the first variable influences the predicted completion statistic 
positively, whilst the inefficiencies implied by repetition would affect completion negatively. Using this 
model we obtain predicted completion percentages of 36 and 32 for Argentina and South Africa respectively. 
However, if we assume zero repetition, we obtain completion ratios of 49 and 47, or ratios that are closer to 
the actual ones we see in Table  2. This simply confirms that if there is something abnormal about the 
situation in the two countries, it is that the level of repetition is too high. This problem requires a solution, 
especially if secondary level completion rates are to be raised. Without such a solution, the cost of expansion 
would be inefficiently high.  
The following graph seemed to offer a compromise between the need to recognise the inherent complexity of 
the policy issue (we have kept three of the five variables) and the need for a presentation of the policy-
relevant information that is sufficiently readable. Each point (of whatever shape) represents a country. The 
horizontal axis indicates the level of country development in terms of per capita income. The vertical axis 
refers to our calculated secondary school completion ratio. The solid trendline captures the trend with respect 
to per capita income and secondary school completion (this is essentially the ‘Completion’ curve from Figure 
3). South Africa (ZAF) and Argentina (ARG), as one might expect from the foregoing discussion, lie above 
the trendline, in other words their secondary school completion statistics lie above the world norm. Onto this 
graph, the global pattern with respect to pupil performance has been superimposed. This is the function of the 
dotted curves, which represent the points at which countries should pass certain PISA mathematics 
thresholds. For example, South Africa, given its per capita income and secondary school completion ratio, 
should have a score of just below 400. Instead, its score is 204. Similarly, Argentina should have a score of 
just above 400. Instead its score is 389. Both countries emerge as under-performers, though the problem is of 
a far greater magnitude in the case of South Africa. In a nutshell, the graph allows one to view both the 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions of human capital development at the secondary level.   
Figure 4: Secondary schooling and human capital development 
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Source: As for Figure 3 above. Note: ISO country codes are used – ‘ZAF’ refers to South Africa. A square () indicates 
that the PISA mathematics score lies within the predicted range (using ranges that are 50 points wide). A triangle () 
indicates that the score lies above the predicted range, and a cross () indicates that the score is below the predicted 
range. All other points represent countries for which an average mathematics score was not available. The solid trendline 
is based on all 123 countries for which GDP per capita and completion data were available (even those countries with 
GDP per capita exceeding 20,000). The dotted trendlines are constructed on the basis of the coefficients obtained by 
regressing the average country score (using the PISA scale) on the log of attainment and the log of GDP per capita for 
the 32 countries for which the data were available (again, these 32 countries include countries with GDP per capita 
exceeding 20,000 and hence not shown on the graph). This regression analysis yielded an R
2
What can the graph tell the policymaker in South Africa or Argentina? Firstly, it tells us (once again) that 
attainment of the last secondary school grade in both countries lies above the norm. From an international 
comparison perspective, there thus appears no serious problem in this regard (though this is not to say there 
are no internal socio-political factors that would support a different argument). The cost of maintaining a 
relatively high level of attainment in secondary schools is high for both countries, given the abnormally high 
levels of repetition (this is not shown in 
 value of 0.57. 
Though the common use of a log scale for GDP per capita has the advantage of making the overall trend (for 
all developing and developed countries) a bit clearer, we avoided this as log scales are one of those graph 
elements that non-economist policymakers find particularly difficult to interpret (in our experience). We have 
limited our view to those countries with a GDP per capita (in 2004 purchasing power parity USD) of 20,000 
and less in order to allow a closer examination of developing countries. 
Figure 4, but our earlier analysis pointed to this). Where both South 
Africa and Argentina lie below the norm is in terms of their average mathematics scores. The situation in 
South Africa is far more serious, whilst in Argentina the problem is borderline (in a different year, Argentina 
could fall within the predicted range, depending on fluctuations, which have been prominent in Argentina, in 
the GDP per capita variable). Yet the message emerging from the data should be similar for both countries, 
namely that quality of schooling at the secondary level is a matter that requires focussed policy attention. It 
seems reasonable to assume that three patterns we have identified are intertwined: below expected learning 
outputs, high repetition, and having no qualification below the Grade 12 level (and in the case of Argentina, 
having only limited standardisation of this qualification across schools). In the previous section, we referred 
to what we perceive to be an insufficient focus on exactly how to raise the quality of education, and 
insufficient attention to trade-offs, in the high-level policy statements of the two countries. We reiterate that 
in terms of policy processes, the challenge seems to lie both in improving the focus on specific policy design 
matters amongst the data analysts, and instilling a more economically-oriented focus into the policy 
formulation process itself. With regard to the latter, the importance of highlighting how school quality and 
country development are so clearly interlinked stands out.  
Looking beyond our two countries, Figure 4 can point to what other countries might provide indications of 
better practice. Such other countries should be more or less at the same level of development as Argentina 
and South. In Latin America, Uruguay provides an example of a country that has reached a high level of 
secondary level attainment, whilst also reaching a level of pupil performance that is above the norm. Uruguay 
is in fact the only Latin American country for which we had the required data which performs beyond its 
range. One should add that the Uruguayan MoE has succeeded in engaging teacher unions on the issue of 
pupil performance in rather innovative ways. Russia could offer valuable insights into achieving quality 
schooling. Amongst East Asian countries, Thailand provides an example of a country with a lower per capita 
income than South Africa and Argentina which nevertheless out-performs both countries.  
8  Conclusion 
This paper has by no means dealt with all the important economics of education policy topics in South Africa 
and Argentina. We have selected, to some extent quite subjectively, those topics that seemed most important, 
and those that presented interesting methodological challenges. Our conclusion should be read in this context. 
We begin with the policy conclusions. Much emphasis was placed on pupil performance as measured in 
standardised tests because recent empirical renditions of the human capital model make it clear how 
important this indicator is as a predictor of economic and developmental success. But pupil performance also 
deserves highlighting because education policies are typically not very good at paying sufficient attention to 
outputs, as opposed to educational inputs such as expenditure and enrolments (areas that often do receive 
sufficient attention in the policies, if not in practice). The relative invisibility of pupil performance is perhaps  
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understandable, given difficulties in the past with regard to its measurement. However, many of these 
difficulties have been removed in recent years with the emergence of better measurement techniques, partly 
as a result of collaboration between countries within international programmes. The invisibility problem is 
probably worse in South Africa and Argentina than it should be due to insufficient use of existing quality 
monitoring datasets, and insufficient across-the-board assessment of pupils at levels of the education system 
below Grade 12.  
So one key policy recommendation would be that there should be more measurement of pupil performance 
(or, to put it differently, human capital within the enrolled population). Both South Africa and Argentina have 
monitoring programmes that perform this task: the Operativo Nacional de Educación in Argentina, and the 
Systemic Evaluation in South Africa. However, the rich datasets emerging from these programmes are 
insufficiently analysed from a variety of perspectives. Ideally, each run of these programmes should lead to a 
variety of analytical works, some focussing on what policy interventions improve performance most cost-
effectively. Moreover, the pupil performance results emerging from these programmes should become a 
standing topic in the media, and, crucially, in interactions between the state and teacher unions.  
With regard to qualifications in the schooling system, in both countries the current situation results in there 
being insufficient educational currency within the labour market. This creates two inefficiency problems. 
Firstly, hiring labour becomes difficult and costly as many youths (at least half in both countries) are not able 
to communicate evidence in an easy format of the human capital they have accumulated from their years of 
schooling. Secondly, within the education system completing Grade 12 assumes an exaggerated importance, 
raising the risk of an over-investment of policy attention and money at this level of the system.  
Better measurement can incentivise better performance amongst schools, but active quality improvement 
interventions by the state will still be needed. A second policy recommendation would therefore be the 
formulation of a clearer statement of how exactly learning outcomes should be improved in schools. It is 
important for national policy to deal with the whole range of needs in the schooling system, but not all inputs 
in the education process carry equal importance in improving outcomes. An official statement of what really 
makes a difference, on the basis of existing evidence, seems like an important policy tool, and a useful 
ingredient in the contractual relationship between the employer and teachers. In a sense, the formulation of 
such a statement implies synthesising and filtering the existing literature on production functions and related 
topics, and commissioning additional analysis where important gaps exist.  
Our analysis into the question of expanding the secondary schooling system indicated that both South Africa 
and Argentina appear to be reasonably successful, in a cross-country comparison, at getting pupils to reach 
the last grade of secondary schooling. The data do not allow us to make a similar comparison dealing with 
successful completion of the last grade, but it seems possible that South Africa is behind where it should be in 
the regard. Clearly, our analysis has viewed this policy problem from a limited perspective – we have not, for 
instance, considered the demand for qualifications, either general or vocational, in the labour market. Yet two 
things have emerged clearly. One is that improving the quality of schooling at the secondary level is at least 
as important as raising enrolments. The other is that repetition is not decreasing in the two countries as fast as 
it should.  
Turning to economics of education methods, we believe we have demonstrated that the Mingat and Tan 
(1998) accounting framework (with some enhancements to deal with the contact time of pupils and teachers, 
and class sizes), offers a useful tool for understanding the economic dynamics in a schooling system in the 
context of the typical constraints faced by developing countries. Analysing just one country within this 
framework seems informative, but applying it to a cross-country analysis can highlight certain features. For 
instance, our comparison emphasises how prominently relatively high teacher pay in South Africa (relative to 
the GDP per capita) forces the system to deal with relatively high pupil/teacher ratios, or how insufficient 
pupil contact time in Argentina may be a policy problem.  
We have tried to throw some light on an analytically difficult area, namely the expansion of secondary 
schooling. The application of international datasets here is more difficult than it is at the primary level, partly 
due to inherent complexities of the secondary level of education, and partly because the collection and 
processing of data at the primary level has understandably received more attention. However, the calculation 
of new indicators at the secondary level, for instance completion rates, as well as the use of pupil  
  26 
performance data from international testing programmes, can provide new insights into the relative success of 
individual countries in delivering secondary education.  
Finally, we discussed the importance of some institutional prerequisites for advancing a more empirical 
approach to policy formulation in education. Two such prerequisites seem to stand out. One is better 
dissemination of official  datasets so that better quantitative policy analysis by research institutions is 
encouraged. In this regard, Argentina has taken some important steps forward with the publication of its 
teacher survey dataset on the internet. The other is the formulation by the national Ministry of Education of 
an official research agenda (including an economics of education agenda) for the country. It should not be the 
only research agenda, but it is a necessary one. Neither South Africa nor Argentina currently has such an 
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Appendix 
The following regression results are based on the 2000 SACMEQ data for Namibia and for mathematics. 
They refer to Grade 6.  





Without teacher test 
score 




coeff.  t-stat 
Beta 
coeff.  t-stat 
Teacher qualifications  0.078**  6.51  0.070**  5.91 
Teacher test score      0.128**  10.44 
Class size squared  -0.025**  -2.10  -0.045**  -3.70 
Contact time  0.025**  2.14  0.026**  2.25 
School infrastructure  0.351**  20.08  0.339**  19.49 
Ruralness  0.113**  6.54  0.082**  4.70 
Pupil repetition  -0.105**  -8.76  -0.100**  -8.41 
Teacher latecoming  -0.122**  -10.44  -0.109**  -9.36 
Textbook availability  0.050**  4.32  0.042**  3.67 
Pupil's meals per day  0.073**  6.39  0.065**  5.69 
Parents' education  0.085**  6.99  0.082**  6.87 
Pupil age  -0.031**  -2.41  -0.029**  -2.29 
Pupil is a girl  -0.033**  -2.82  -0.031**  -2.70 
Number of observations    4971    4952 
F    233    229 
R  
2  0.36    0.38 
Dependent variable    0.361    0.376 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. 